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I. INTRODUCTION
John participated in a crime with several accomplices. One of his
accomplices, Harry, made statements to his girlfriend and to the police
that implicate John. Another accomplice, Bob, made statements to a
bartender that implicated John. Imagine that John is on trial. The prose-
cution moves to enter Harry's confession to the police, Harry's state-
ments to his girlfriend, and Bob's statements to the bartender. For the
sake of argument, assume both witnesses are unavailable. The defense
objects that the admission of these statements violates the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment because neither Harry nor Bob is avail-
able to testify under oath, before the jury, subject to cross-examination.
The prosecution counters that Harry's and Bob's statements are reliable
and should be admitted under the hearsay exception for statements of an
unavailable declarant made against the declarant's penal interest.'
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) states that the following is not
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable:
A statement which at the time of its making is so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary'or proprietary interest, or so far tended to sub-
ject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a
claim by the declarant against another that a reasonable person in the
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless
believing it to be true.2
Statements against interest "are admissible because it is presumed that
1. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
2. Id.
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one will not make a statement damaging to one's self unless it is true."3
The analysis of declarations against interest, however, "may vary with
the interest at issue, whether pecuniary, penal, or otherwise. It may also
vary with the type of proceeding, whether civil or criminal, and with the
party against whom the statement is offered."4 Additionally, the analy-
sis of a declaration against interest may vary depending upon whether
the court is analyzing the statement under Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3) or a state evidentiary rule.
One could argue that the court should admit Harry's confession
against John as a statement against Harry's penal interest because the
confession as a narrative as a whole is against Harry's penal interest,
even though the specific statements that implicate John may not be
against Harry's personal penal interest. The prosecutor could also argue
that Harry's statement to his girlfriend and Bob's statement to the bar-
tender are more reliable than Harry's statement to the police because the
statements were made to friends and therefore were not made in order to
curry the favor of the police.
The admissibility of an unavailable codefendant's confession incul-
pating a defendant has posed significant problems for the courts. While
codefendant confessions may be persuasive evidence of the declarant's
guilt, the reliability of these statements in determining a codefendant's
guilt is more questionable because the declarant may have incentives to
shift blame and implicate a codefendant.5 This is especially true when a
confession is made to the police or other state agents. For this reason,
the Supreme Court has been hesitant to admit an unavailable accom-
plice's confession made to the police that inculpates a defendant.6
The Court recently addressed the problem of codefendant confes-
sions being admitted as statements against penal interest in Lilly v. Vir-
ginia.' The Court in a plurality opinion held that "statements against
penal interest do not qualify as a firmly rooted hearsay exception as a
class."8 The Court's holding has been heralded by the defense bar as
offering "another important weapon to the defense arsenal."9
Unfortunately, however, Lilly may not offer as much protection as
3. 5 JOHN M. McLAUGHLIN ET. AL., WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 804.06(1) (2d ed.
2000).
4. Id.
5. See generally Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Williamson v. United States, 512
U.S. 594 (1994).
6. See generally Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986); Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S.
594 (1994).
7. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
8. United States v. Taylor, No. 98-4517, 98-4518, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19239, *29 (4th
Cir. Aug. 16, 1999).
9. David S. Rudolf & Gordon Widenhouse, New Limitation on Prosecution by Hearsay, THE
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predicted. Lilly may not be a prosecutor's dream, but it is not a prosecu-
tor's nightmare either. The mandates of the opinion are ambiguous
because Lilly is a plurality opinion. These ambiguities present opportu-
nities for prosecutors. This Comment will examine the impact of Lilly
in state and federal criminal trials and will show that, when interpreted
broadly, Lilly could potentially allow for the liberal admission of accom-
plice confessions and may undermine protections for defendants histori-
cally located in Bruton. °
Part II will place Lilly within the context of prior case law regard-
ing the Confrontation Clause. Part III examines the impact of Lilly in
jurisdictions bound by Williamson." Part IV explores the impact of
Lilly on the admissibility of custodial confessions. Part V looks at
Lilly's impact on the admissibility of confessions to family and friends.
Part VI concludes that a broad interpretation of Lilly in state and federal
courts could potentially allow for liberal admission of confessions and
may undermine protections located in Bruton.
II. BACKGROUND
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the
accused the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."1 2
Its purpose is to "ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal
defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adver-
sary proceeding before the tier of fact."' 3 Rigorous testing usually
includes three factors: (1) the oath that a witness takes prior to testifying
which is deemed to reflect upon the veracity of the declarant's state-
ments; (2) the opportunity for the jury or judge to observe the witnesses
demeanor in order to assess his or her reliability; and (3) the defense's
right to cross-examine the witness. Cross-examination, "the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,"'" allows the
accused to test the credibility of the declarant's testimony.
Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.""5 Hearsay is inadmissible. His-
torically, however, there have been exceptions to the rule that hearsay is
inadmissible in cases where the court finds that a statement is so reliable
CHAMPION, Dec. 1999, at 43-44; see also Benjamin E. Rosenberg, The Future of Codefendant
Confessions, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 516 (2000).
10. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
11. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).
14. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
15. FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(3).
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that cross-examination is expected to add little if any benefit.' 6 Thus,
there is an inherent tension between the Confrontation Clause and evi-
dentiary hearsay exceptions.
In Mattox v. United States'7 the Supreme Court recognized this ten-
sion between the Confrontation Clause and hearsay. Mattox held "that
the Confrontation Clause's primary purpose was to prevent depositions
and ex parte affidavits from being used against the accused in place of in
person cross examination."' 8 The Court, however, also noted that the
"Framers 'obviously intended to ... respect' exceptions to this right."' 9
The Court held that the hearsay exception for dying declarations did not
violate the Confrontation Clause because dying declarations "from time
immemorial have been treated as competent testimony."" ° The Court
later extended the protections of the Confrontation Clause to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v. Texas.2
In Ohio v. Roberts,22 the Supreme Court created a general frame-
work in which to analyze the relationship between evidentiary hearsay
exceptions and the Confrontation Clause. The Court held that:
the veracity of hearsay statements is sufficiently dependable to allow
the untested admission of such statements against an accused when
(1) "the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or
(2) it contains "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" such that
adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if anything, to the
statements reliability.2 3
A hearsay exception is firmly rooted if it is based on "long standing
judicial and legislative experience"214 that the exception is so well
founded that the admission of evidence within the exception "comports
with the 'substance of the constitutional protection.' "25 Prior to Lilly,
the Court had not decided whether the hearsay exception for a declar-
ant's statement against penal interest was firmly rooted.
16. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (holding that hearsay exception for
dying declarations did not violate the Confrontation Clause); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346
(1992) (holding that hearsay exception for spontaneous utterances did not violate the
Confrontation Clause); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
17. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
18. See Kim M. Minix, Lilly v. Virginia: Answering the Williamson Question-Is the
Statement Against Penal Interest Exception "Firmly Rooted" Under Confrontation Clause
Analysis?, 51 MERCER L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2000) (summarizing Mattox).
19. Id. at 1345 (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 125 (1999)).
20. Muttoni v. State, 25 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tex. App. 2000).
21. Minix, supra note 18, at 1345; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
22. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
23. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124-25 (1999) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
24. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990).
25. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895))
(citations omitted).
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In Illinois v. Lee, the Court noted that over the years "the Court has
spoken with one voice in declaring presumptively unreliable accom-
plices' confessions that incriminate defendants. ' 26 The Supreme Court
held that "when one person accuses another of a crime under circum-
stances in which the declarant stands to gain by inculpating another, the
accusation is presumptively suspect and must be subjected to the scru-
tiny of cross-examination."27
In Lee, the Court found that the confession of an accomplice was
inadmissible against a defendant because the presumption of unreliabil-
ity could not be rebutted.28 The Court, however, eschewed addressing
the case under the hearsay exception for a declarant's statement against
penal interest. The Supreme Court rejected the "categorization of the
hearsay involved in this case as a simple 'declaration against penal inter-
est.' That concept defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation
Clause analysis. We decide this case as involving a confession by an
accomplice which incriminates a defendant. ' 29  Since Lee, "whether
statements against penal interest qualify as a firmly rooted hearsay
exception as a class or whether each statement must qualify through its
particularized guarantee of trustworthiness has divided the Circuit Court
of Appeals."3 Furthermore, state courts were also free to conclude that
state evidentiary exceptions for statements against penal interest were
firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause purposes.
In Williamson v. United States,3' the United States Supreme Court
provided federal courts with more direction in analyzing confessions of
an accomplice that inculpate a defendant under Rule 804(b)(3). The
opinion attempted to define the term "statement" as it is used in the
hearsay exception for statements against interest. Prior to Williamson,
there was "a long-running debate among commentators over the admis-
sibility of collateral statements. 32 Collateral statements are statements
of a declarant within the narrative of a confession that are collateral to
26. 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 546.
29. Id. at 544 n.5.
30. United States v. Taylor, No. 98-4517, 98-4518, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19239, *29 (4th
Cir. Aug. 16, 1999). Several Circuits found or suggested that the exception was firmly rooted.
See United States v. Keltner, 147 F.3d 662, 671 (8th Cir. 1988); LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d
1253, 1268-69 (9th Cir. 1988); Neuman v. Rivers, 125 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 1997); United
States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1363 (7th Cir. 1991); States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 62 (Ist Cir.
1995). Other Circuits, however, found that the exception was not firmly rooted. See State v.
Flores, 985 F.2d 770, 775-76 (5th Cir. 1995); Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir.
1996). Several Circuits declined to decide the issue. See United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538,
544-46 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Moses, 148 F.3d 277, 281 (3rd Cir. 1998).
31. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
32. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 611.
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the declarant's admission of guilt and inculpate someone else. Wigmore
"took the strongest position in favor of admissibility arguing that the
statement may be accepted not merely as to the specific fact against
interest, but also as to every fact contained in the statement."33 Wig-
more argued that the entire statement should be admitted because the
"statement is made in circumstances fairly indicating the declarant's
sincerity and accuracy."3 McCormick, however, "argued for the admis-
sibility of collateral statements of a neutral character, and for the exclu-
sion of collateral statements of a self serving character. '35 Professor
Jefferson took the narrowest approach asserting that "neither collateral
neutral or collateral self-serving statements" should be admissible.36
In Williamson, a federal district court allowed the prosecution to
enter into evidence a confession of an accomplice made to the police
implicating the defendant after the accomplice refused to testify. 37 The
district court reasoned that the confession was admissible under the
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest 38 because the
accomplice implicated himself and therefore the accomplice's confes-
sion was against his penal interest. 39
The Supreme Court reversed the district court concluding that:
Nothing in the text of Rule 804(b)(3) or the general theory of the
hearsay rules suggests that admissibility should turn on whether a
statement is collateral to a self-inculpatory statement. The fact that a
statement is self-inculpatory does make it more reliable; but the fact
that a statement is collateral to a self-inculpatory statement says noth-
ing at all about the collateral statement's reliability.n
The Court held that "the most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is
that it does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even
if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpa-
tory."4 1 The Court noted that "[o]ne of the most effective ways to lie is
to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly per-
suasive because of its self-inculpatory nature. 42
The Court further held that:
The question under Rule 804(b)(3) is always whether the statement
33. Id. at 611-12 (quoting 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1465, at 271 (3d ed. 1940)).
34. Id. at 612 (quoting WIGMORE supra note 33, § 1465, at 217).
35. Id. (quoting MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §256, at 552-53 (1954)).
36. Id. (quoting Bernard S. Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1, 62-63 (1944)).
37. Id. at 597.
38. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
39. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 597.
40. Id. at 600.
41. Id. at 600-01.
42. Id. at 599-600.
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was sufficiently against the declarant's penal interest "that a reasona-
ble person in the declarant's position would not have made the state-
ment unless believing it to be true," and this question can only be
answered in light of all the surrounding circumstances.43
Moreover, the Court stated that "whether a statement is self-inculpatory
or not can only be determined by viewing it in context. Even statements
that are on their face neutral may actually be against the declarant's
interest.""4
This statement left the lower courts with some room to admit the
truly self-inculpatory portions of an accomplice's confession that indi-
rectly implicate a defendant. 5 For example, if an accomplice states "I
hid the gun in [the defendant's] apartment," the Court noted that,
although this is not a confession to a crime, the statement is self-inculpa-
tory because it "is likely to help the police find the murder weapon.""
Furthermore, the Williamson Court argued that even though collateral
statements are inadmissible, a co-conspirator's self-inculpatory state-
ments which are admissible can implicate a defendant indirectly when
combined with corroborating evidence.47
Some federal courts have interpreted Williamson broadly by con-
struing the "surrounding circumstances" of a statement liberally in order
to admit statements of an accomplice that inculpate a defendant.48 Other
courts, however, have construed Williamson narrowly to require the sup-
pression of collateral neutral statements as well as self-serving collateral
statements.49
The Supreme Court, however, did not address "Williamson's claim
43. Id. at 603-04.




48. See 3 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET. AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 419 (7th
ed. Supp. 2000). This manual catalogs the following examples: United States v. Vernor, 902 F.2d
1182, 1188 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding statements of an accomplice that inculpated defendant were
admissible as a statement against penal interest where accomplice did not attempt to shift blame,
no evidence that accomplice was promised leniency, the statements were made after Miranda
warnings were given, the events were recent, and the statements were voluntarily given); United
States v. Keltner, 147 F.3d 662, 670 (8th Cir. 1998) (admitting statements of accomplice that
inculpated the defendant under Williamson because the statement was self-inculpatory as the
declarant implicated himself in a conspiracy, there was corroborating evidence, and no promise of
immunity); Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that accomplice
statement that inculpated a defendant was admissible under Williamson because the statement as a
whole was self-inculpatory as the entire statement equally inculpated both accomplice and the
defendant, the accomplice did not try to shift blame, no promise of leniency, voluntarily given,
and declarant had knowledge of details).
49. See Richard Sahuc, Comment, The Exception that Swallows the Rule: The Disparate
Treatment of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) as Interpreted in United States v. Williams, 55
U. MIAMI L. REV. 867 (2001).
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that the statements were also made inadmissible by the Confrontation
Clause."' 5° The Court declined to decide whether the "hearsay exception
for declarations against interest [is] 'firmly rooted' for Confrontation
Clause purposes."' 51 Additionally, since the decision was based solely
upon the Court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it did
not bind state court decisions interpreting state rules of evidence. As a
result, some state courts adopted the doctrine outlined in Williamson
while other state courts adopted a more liberal approach, allowing the
entire confession as a narrative, including the accomplice's collateral
statements implicating a defendant, to be entered against a defendant as
a statement against the accomplice's penal interest.52
In Lilly, the Court addressed this conflict by addressing the limits
imposed by the Confrontation Clause, which are equally applicable in
state and federal courts. The Court held that "statements against penal
interest do not qualify as a firmly rooted hearsay exception as a class."53
The case revolved around various crimes committed by Benjamin Lee
Lilly, his brother Mark Lilly, and Mark's roommate Gary Barker. The
men went on a crime spree robbing stores and eventually abducting and
murdering Alex DeFilippis. 54 While being interrogated by the police,
Mark confessed to participating in the crime spree, but stated that Benja-
50. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605.
51. Id.
52. An excellent summary is available in Leslie Morsek's article Lilly v. Virginia: Silencing
the "Firmly Rooted" Hearsay Exception with Regard To An Accomplices Testimony And Its
Rejuvenation Of The Confrontation Clause, 33 AKRON L. R. 523, 539-40 n.68 (1999). As noted in
her article: (I) several states allowed the admission of the entire narrative as a confession
including collateral statements. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Ky. 1990);
State v. Gilliam 635 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ohio 1994), overruled in part by State v. Madrigal, 721
N.E.2d 52 (Ohio 2000); State v. Nielsen, 853 P.2d 256, 268 (Or. 1993); State v. Wilson, 367
S.E.2d 589, 598 (N.C. 1988); State v. Kiewart, 605 A.2d 1031, 1037 (N.H. 1992); Chandler v.
Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 219 (Va. 1995). (2) other states bared the admission of collateral
statements under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. See State v. Hoak,
692 P.2d 1174, 1179 (Idaho 1984); Williams v. State, 667 So. 2d 15, 20 (Miss. 1996); State v.
Whelchel, 801 P.2d 948, 954-55 (Wash. 1990). (3) many states have adopted the Court's doctrine
in Williamson, excluding collateral statements and only allowing truly self-inculpatory statements.
See Smith v. State, 647 A.2d 1083, 1088 (Del. 1994); United States v. Hammond, 681 A.2d 1140,
1146 (D.C. 1996); State v. Hallum, 585 N.W.2d 249, 256 (Iowa 1998); State v. Smith, 643 So. 2d
1221, 1221-22 (La. 1994); State v. Matusky, 682 A.2d 694, 706 (Md. 1996); State v. Ford, 539
N.W.2d 214, 227 (Minn. 1995); State v. Castle, 948 P.2d 688, 694 (Mont. 1997); State v. Torres,
971 P.2d 1296, 1275 (N.M. 1998); Miles v. State, 918 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996);
hi re Anthony Ray, 489 S.E.2d 289, 298 (W. Va. 1997); Johnson v. State, 930 P.2d 358, 363
(Wyo. 1996). (4) finally some states excluded collateral statements within the language of the
hearsay exception, itself. See ARK. R. EvID. 804(b)(3); IND. R. EvID. 804(b)(3); ME. R. EVID.
804(b)(3); NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.345(2)(1) (1997); N.J. R. EvID. 803(25); N.D. CENT. CODE 804
(b)(3); VT. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
53. United States v. Taylor, No. 98-4517, 98-4518, 1999 U.S. App. 19239, at *29 (4th Cir.
Aug. 16, 1999).
54. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 120 (1999).
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min shot DeFilipis and masterminded the robberies." Prior to making
his statement, however, prosecutors told Mark that unless he broke with
his family ties and implicated his brother, he could face serious criminal
penalties.56 Furthermore, Mark mentioned that he had been drunk dur-
ing most of the crime spree.57
Benjamin was tried separately from Mark and Gary.58 Mark
invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to testify against Benjamin at
trial.59 The Virginia state court then allowed the prosecution to intro-
duce Mark's entire confession to the police under the state evidentiary
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest.60 The Supreme
Court of Virginia affirmed the lower court, holding that "admissibility
into evidence of the statement against penal interest of an unavailable
witness is a 'firmly rooted' exception to the hearsay rule in Virginia."'"
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari62 and reversed the
Virginia Supreme Court on the grounds that the admission of Mark's
statement to police violated Benjamin's right to confront Mark under the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.63
The Court's decision, however, was a plurality opinion and there-
fore the Court did not offer one cohesive rational. Justice Stevens wrote
an opinion joined by Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice
Breyer. Justice Stevens divided the hearsay exception for statements
against penal interest into three categories: (1) voluntary admissions
against the declarant; (2) exculpatory evidence offered by a defendant
who claims that the declarant committed the offense; and (3) evidence
offered by the prosecution to establish the guilt a defendant based upon
the confession of an accomplice.64 He concluded that the third category
composed of "accomplices confessions that inculpate a criminal defen-
dant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that
concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence."65
Justice Stevens based his decision on the fact that:
the "against penal interest" exception to the hearsay rule-unlike
other previously recognized firmly rooted exceptions-is not gener-
ally based on the maxim that statements made without a motive to





60. Id. at 122.
61. Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 534 (Va. 1998).
62. Lilly v. Virginia, 525 U.S. 981 (1998).
63. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 139.
64. Id. at 127.
65. Id. at 134.
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reflect on the legal consequences of one's statement, and in situations
that are exceptionally conducive to veracity, lack the dangers of inac-
curacy that typically accompany hearsay. The exception, rather, is
founded on the broad assumption "that a person is unlikely to fabri-
cate a statement against his own interest at the time it is made."66
Relying on past precedent, Justice Stevens concluded that accom-
plice confessions that implicate a defendant are untrustworthy because
the statements implicating the defendant are not "unambiguously
adverse to the penal interest of the declarant." '67 Justice Stevens further
argued that the "practice of admitting statements in [the third] category
under an exception to the hearsay rule-to the extent that such a practice
exists in certain jurisdictions-is, unlike the first category or even the
second, of quite recent vintage."68
Justice Stevens asserted that his conclusion that accomplice confes-
sions do not fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception is not a com-
plete ban on the government's use of a non-testifying accomplice's
statements. He argued that "it simply means the Government must sat-
isfy the second prong of the Ohio v. Roberts test in order to introduce
such statements."69 He stated that "courts should independently review
whether the government's proffered guarantees of trustworthiness sat-
isfy the demands of the [Confrontation] Clause."7 °
Justice Stevens held that it is "highly unlikely that the presumptive
unreliability that attaches to accomplices' confessions" when "the gov-
ernment is involved in the statements' production, and when the state-
ment describes past events and have not been subjected to adversarial
testing" can be rebutted.7" He asserted that "hearsay evidence used to
convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its
inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial."7
Stevens argued that the fact an accomplice's confession was voluntary
or made after being informed of their Miranda rights is also not indica-
tive of trustworthiness.73
Additionally, Justice Stevens observed that the absence of an
express promise of leniency "does not enhance [a statement's] reliability
to the level necessary for their untested admission.""
66. Id. at 126 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 (1973)).
67. Id. at 132 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 552-53 (1986)).
68. Id. at 130.
69. Id. at 134-35 n.5 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 137.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 138 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 139.
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Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but asserted that the admis-
sion of Mark's statements was a "paradigmatic Confrontation violation,"
and "since the violation is clear, the case need be remanded only for a
harmless error determination." Thus, Justice Scalia does not comment
on Justice Stevens's reliability analysis under the second prong of Rob-
erts. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion that restated his view
that the Confrontation Clause "is implicated by extrajudicial statements
only insofar as they are contained in formalized, testimonial materials,"
but he also agreed with the Chief Justice "that the Clause does not
impose a blanket ban on the government's use of accomplice statements
that incriminate a defendant."75 Justice Scalia and Thomas wrote opin-
ions concurring in the judgment in Lilly, however:
they espouse a different view of the Confrontation Clause. . .that
view focuses on the reason that the confrontation right was included
in the Bill of Rights in the first place. The danger addressed by the
Framers was the pernicious practice of the government engineering a
conviction by preparing and admitting formalized affidavits" of
declarants that would never be subject to cross-examination.76
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice
Kennedy, concurred in the result but disagreed with Justice Stevens's
conclusions that "all accomplice confessions that inculpate a criminal
defendant are not within a firmly rooted hearsay exception to the hear-
say rule under Ohio v. Roberts" and "that appellate courts should inde-
pendently review the governments proffered guarantees of
trustworthiness under the second half of the Roberts inquiry. 77
"The Chief Justice argued that Mark's confession, insofar as it
implicated [Benjamin] was not a declaration against penal interest in the
first place, since it simply shifted blame to [Benjamin] and did not
implicate Mark in the murder. ' 78 Justice Rehnquist argued that the case
"therefore does not raise the question whether the Confrontation Clause
permits the admission of a genuinely self-inculpatory statement that also
inculpates a codefendant, and our precedent does not compel the broad
holding suggested by the plurality."'7 9
Justice Rehnquist disagreed with Justice Stevens's analysis because
it "results in a complete ban on the government's use of accomplice
confessions that inculpate a codefendant."8 ° Justice Rehnquist argued
that "confessions to family members or friends, bear sufficient indicia of
75. Id. at 143 (citations omitted).
76. SALTZBURG, supra note 48, at 419.
77. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 144.
78. SALTZBURG, supra note 48, at 419.
79. Id. (quoting Lilly, 527 U.S. at 146).
80. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 145.
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reliability to be placed before the jury without confrontation of the
declarant."' Justice Rehnquist also noted "with approval" lower court
decisions that "found the declaration against penal interest exception to
be firmly rooted, as applied to... statements made in custody that truly
implicate the declarant in criminal activity and do not attempt to shift
blame to the defendant."82 Justice Rehnquist would also give more
"deference to trial judges who undertake the second prong of the Rob-
erts inquiry" because "they are better able to evaluate whether a particu-
lar statement given in a particular setting is sufficiently reliable that
cross-examination would add little to its trustworthiness. 83
III. THE IMPACT OF LILLY IN JURISDICTIONS BOUND BY WILLIAMSON
Lilly clearly impacts state courts that did not adopt the approach of
Williamson by adding additional constitutional requirements, although
the substance of these limits will be discussed later in Sections IV and
V. The impact of Lilly in federal and state courts bound by Williamson,
however, is unclear. Broadly interpreted, Lilly can be seen as requiring
an analysis of all out-of-court accomplice confessions for indicia of reli-
ability, regardless of whether the statements are truly self-inculpatory
under Williamson. A more narrow view of Lilly, as Chief Justice Rehn-
quist advocated, suggests that the statements addressed in Lilly (an
accomplice's confession to police that shifts blame to a defendant) gen-
erally would not survive analysis under Williamson and therefore Lilly
"does not raise the question whether the Confrontation Clause permits
the admission of a genuinely self-inculpatory statement that also incul-
pates a codefendant." '84 Thus, according to a narrow view, Lilly may not
require any additional analysis of an accomplice's truly self-inculpatory
statements that inculpate a defendant as defined in Williamson because
either: (1) truly self-inculpatory statements could be firmly rooted; or (2)
because the Williamson test itself requires that the statements be reliable.
For example, some scholars argue that "the impact of the [Lilly]
decision on Federal Rule 804(b)(3) is negligible, however, because there
was no majority opinion in the case, and a close reading indicates that a
statement falling within Rule 804(b)(3), as construed by the Court in
Williamson v. United States, would in fact satisfy the defendant's right
to confront."85 These scholars argue that "even under the pluralities
approach, a truly self-inculpatory declaration would satisfy the Confron-
81. Id. at 147.
82. SALTZBURG, supra note 48, at 419.
83. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 149.
84. SALTZBURG, supra note 48, at 419 (quoting Lilly, 527 U.S. at 146).
85. Id.
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tation Clause because it would carry sufficient circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness."86 Furthermore, in Williamson, the Court noted that
"the very fact that a statement is generally self-inculpatory-which our
reading of Rule 804(b)(3) requires-is itself one of the particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness that makes a statement admissible under
the Confrontation Clause."87
Thus, it would appear that Lilly might actually have little impact in
jurisdictions bound by Williamson. However, even if Lilly requires addi-
tional analysis of truly self-inculpatory accomplice confessions, the
opinion may not be the "important weapon" 88 that the defense bar
predicts because, as discussed below, the additional analysis required
under Lilly is unclear.
A. The Impact of Lilly in Federal Courts
Prior to Lilly, most federal courts interpreted Williamson to require
three elements in order to establish that a statement is admissible under
Rule 804(b)(3): (1) that the declarant is unavailable; (2) that the state-
ment is against the declarant's penal interest; and (3) that corroborating
circumstances exist indicating that the statement is trustworthy.89
Therefore, as noted above, some scholars have argued that the impact of
Lilly is "negligible" because "a close reading indicates that a statement
falling within Rule 804(b)(3), as construed by the Court in Williamson v.
United States, would in fact satisfy the defendant's right to confront
because the Williamson test includes an analysis of a statement's
trustworthiness .90
In United States v. Gomez,9' the prosecution took this argument a
step further and asserted that in Williamson the Court defined "the class
of statements against penal interest very narrowly to include only those
parts of statements that are truly self-inculpatory. It argues the William-
son Court implied that as long as a statement fits within this narrower
rule it satisfies Confrontation Clause analysis.92
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the prosecu-
tion's argument in Gomez and concluded that "following the most recent
guidance of the Supreme Court, however, we decline to adopt that con-
clusion" because in Lilly "the Supreme Court explicitly considered the
use of statements against penal interest offered by the prosecution in the
86. Id. at 420.
87. Id. (quoting Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 605 (1994).
88. Rudolf & Widenhouse, supra note 9, at 44; see also Rosenberg, supra note 9.
89. United States v. Robbins, 197 F.3d 829, 838 (7th Cir. 1999).
90. SALTZBURG, supra note 48, at 417.
91. 191 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 1999).
92. Id. at 1221.
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absence of the declarant to incriminate a criminal defendant. Five mem-
bers of the Court held that such statements do not categorically satisfy
Confrontation Clause concerns." 93 The circuit court noted that the Chief
Justice's opinion reserved "the possibility that 'a genuinely self-inculpa-
tory statement that also inculpates a codefendant' might nevertheless
satisfy a firmly rooted hearsay exception." '94 The court argued that Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion "appeared to distinguish between 'genuinely
self-inculpatory statements' and statements given as 'part of a custodial
confession' of the sort that this Court has viewed with 'special suspi-
cion' given a codefendant's strong motivation to implicate the defendant
and to exonerate himself." 95
In United States v. Lopez-Garcia,96 the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit found that even if a statement is admissible under Rule
804(b)(3), it must be subjected to analysis under the second prong of
Roberts.97 The court noted that it addressed "the Confrontation Clause
issue separately from [its] discussion of admissibility under Rule
804(b)(3) because the two standards are not coterminous. 98 United
States v. Castelan,99 which was decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, held that even if a statement was properly admitted
under Rule 804(b)(3), "in Lilly, a plurality of the Supreme Court con-
cluded that under the Confrontation Clause post-arrest statements made
by a non-testifying accomplice that inculpate a defendant cannot be
admitted against the defendant unless the government demonstrates that
the statements bear 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' ,,too
Some circuits have declined to decide whether statements that qual-
ify under Rule 804(b)(3) are per se reliable for Confrontation Clause
purposes. In United States v. Tocco, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit found that an accomplice's statement implicating himself and the
defendant in a conspiracy qualified under Williamson as a statement
against interest pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3). 01 The court asserted that,
despite the fact that the defendant did not argue that the admission of the
accomplice's statements violated the Confrontation Clause, "we find
that the circumstances surrounding [the accomplice's] statements in this
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 512 U.S. 116, 190 (1999)).
95. Id. The Court went on to analyze the statements under Lilly and the second prong of Ohio
v. Roberts, concluding that the accomplice confession did not contain sufficient indicia of
reliability. Id. at 1222-23.
96. No. 98-2252, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22369 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1999).
97. Id. at *15.
98. Id. at *11 n.4.
99. 219 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2000).
100. Id. at 695.
101. 200 F.3d 401, 415 (6th Cir. 2000).
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case indicate that the statements were trustworthy, particularly in light of
the fact that [the accomplice's] statements were made to his son" and not
the police.° 2 Thus, the court did not decide whether truly self-inculpa-
tory statements qualifying as statements against interest under Rule
804(b)(3) according to Williamson must be subjected to analysis under
Lilly because the court found the statements were reliable based on the
fact they were made to a family member.
Other circuits, however, appear to be more skeptical about what
type of additional analysis is required under Lilly. In United States v.
Shea, 0 3 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that an
accomplice's statement was admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). The court
noted that "the important question is whether anything is altered by the
Supreme Court's subsequent decision" in Lilly."°4 The court held that:
while Lilly's full reach may be unclear-there was no single majority
opinion-it does not in our view affect the admissibility of the state-
ments at issue here: all those identified in this case were made to
friends or companions, not to police, and were not of the "blame
shifting variety". . . even if Lilly is more far reaching than we think
likely, it would not affect the outcome here. 10 5
Thus, it appears that federal courts have interpreted Lilly as either
(1) requiring additional analysis of truly self-inculpatory statements
under the Williamson test, or (2) encompassing (and possibly enhancing)
the reliability analysis already required under Williamson. Federal
courts do not appear to embrace Justice Rehnquist's assertion that truly
self-inculpatory statements may be a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
In time, as Lilly is interpreted, some courts may conclude, as discussed
below, that additional analysis is not required because truly self-inculpa-
tory statements, as defined in Williamson, are inherently reliable.
B. The Impact of Lilly in State Courts That Have
Adopted Williamson
For the same reasons discussed above, Lilly may have little impact
in state courts that have adopted the Williamson approach for their
domestic hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. In fact,
in State v. Gonzalez10 6 a state court that adopted Williamson for their
state hearsay exception argued that Lilly "does not alter the result or the
analysis" in cases of an accomplice's truly self-inculpatory confession
102. Id. at 416.
103. 211 F.3d 658 (1st Cir. 2000).
104. Id. at 669.
105. Id. (quoting United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1302 (1st Cir. 1997)).
106. 989 P.2d 419 (N.M. 1999).
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that inculpates a defendant because "the 'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness' imposed by the federal Confrontation Clause are inher-
ently and necessarily a part of the statement-against-interest analysis
under our [state's hearsay] rule."' 7
In Gonzalez, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a state trial
court did not err in admitting against the defendant the statements that an
unavailable accomplice made to a friend stating that the accomplice
murdered the victim and that defendant paid him $300 dollars to do so.
The state court admitted these statements under the state hearsay excep-
tion for statements against penal interest. In State v. Torres, the New
Mexico Supreme Court adopted the approach in Williamson.' °8 The
court reasoned that the accomplice's statements were truly self-inculpa-
tory and therefore were admissible as statements against interest. The
New Mexico Supreme Court found that the Confrontation Clause was
not violated because the statements contained sufficient guarantees of
reliability.
The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the trial court because
the accomplice's declaration passed the Williamson test as the
accomplice's:
declaration that Defendant paid him for the killings qualifies as a
statement against penal interest on two grounds. First, the assertion
implicates [the accomplice] for the crime of first degree murder and
exposes him to liability for other crimes ... [s]econd in context, the
assertion provides motive and supports an inference that [the accom-
plice] deliberately and willfully killed the victims.'° 9
The court held that the statements did not violate the federal Confronta-
tion Clause because: (1) the statements were made to a friend' 'o and (2)
the "against-interest element of [the accomplice's] declaration necessa-
rily satisfied the 'trustworthiness' burden imposed by the federal Con-
frontation Clause."'''
Gonzales demonstrates that when interpreted broadly, the William-
son test can be quite permissive and could lead to the admission of col-
laterally neutral statements. Although the court in Gonzales found that
the accomplice's statements were truly self-inculpatory, others might
argue that the accomplices statement that the defendant paid him to kill
the victim shifted blame from the accomplice or were, at least, neutral
because the statements equally inculpated both the accomplice and the
107. Id. at 428.
108. Id. at 421.
109. Id. at 422 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 423.
111. Id. at 424.
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defendant.' 12
Therefore, if statements that pass the Williamson test are considered
to be per se reliable for Confrontation Clause purposes, then it is possi-
ble that state and federal courts interpreting Williamson broadly could
admit collaterally neutral as well as truly self-inculpatory statements
under Williamson and Lilly. Thus, prosecutors in states that have
adopted Williamson may not be affected by Lilly if state courts find that
statements passing Williamson are for all practical matters per se relia-
ble. Furthermore, prosecutors that are able to admit collaterally neutral
statements under a broad interpretation of Williamson in state courts,
may be able to admit collaterally neutral statements and still avoid
Lilly's requirement that accomplice confessions be subjected to more
searching analysis. The same would be true in federal courts that inter-
pret Williamson broadly.
Although Lilly appears to have a neutral, if any, effect in jurisdic-
tions bound by Williamson, Lilly may actually help prosecutors because
it can be interpreted as legitimizing statements admitted under a broad
interpretation of Williamson. Williamson left the Confrontation Clause
issue open. Prosecutors can now argue that Lilly fills this gap. Further-
more, prosecutors can point to Justice Rehnquist's opinion and assert
that Lilly "does not raise the question whether the Confrontation Clause
permits the admission of a genuinely self-inculpatory statement that also
inculpates a codefendant"' 13 and argue that statements that pass Wil-
liamson are inherently reliable and therefore should not be subject to
more searching analysis.
Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist's approach is not limited to juris-
dictions bound by Williamson. In State v. Kimble," 4 a North Carolina
court of appeals held that, under Lilly, truly self-inculpatory statements
are firmly rooted. 15 The North Carolina Supreme Court, which has not
adopted the approach of Williamson, 1 6 only requires that a trial court
find that: (1) a statement is against the declarant's penal interest; and (2)
"corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement if it exposes the declarant to criminal liability."' 7 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals, in Kimble, nevertheless, made a distinction
112. See id. at 422. The defendant argued that the accomplices confession was not against the
accomplices interests because (1) the accomplice may have thought that he was decreasing his
culpability or (2) the accomplice, as a gang member, may have been "bragging." Id.
113. SALTZBURG, supra note 48, at 419 (quoting Lilly v. Virginia 527 U.S. 116, 146 (1999)).
114. 535 S.E.2d 882 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
115. Id. at 886.
116. Id. at 888 ("our Supreme Court does not require that collateral remarks inculpating the
defendant be redacted from an out-of-court statement that also contains self-inculpating remarks
in order to admit the statement under Rule 804(b)(3)").
117. Id. at 885 (citing State v. Wilson, 367 S.E.2d 589, 599 (N.C. 1988)).
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between "dual-inculpatory" statements that inculpate both the declarant
and the defendant, and "purely self-inculpatory" statements that only
inculpate the declarant. The court held that "purely self-inculpatory
statements, unlike the dual-inculpatory statements in Lilly, are classic
'statements against interest' and thus fall within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception."11 8
In the future as more state courts consider the issue, some may
choose not to adopt Justice Rehnquist's argument. Even if courts do not
consider statements admissible under Williamson to be firmly rooted for
Confrontation Clause purposes, the additional analysis required under
Lilly may not be a real barrier because "a close reading indicates that a
statement falling within Rule 804(b)(3), as construed by the court in
Williamson v. United States, would in fact satisfy the declarant's right to
confront."" 9 Furthermore, even if Lilly is interpreted as requiring addi-
tional analysis beyond that required in Williamson, the substance of the
additional analysis required was left open by the plurality opinion, as
discussed in Sections IV and V.
IV. THE IMPACT OF LILLY ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
CUSTODIAL STATEMENTS
Once a court has concluded that Lilly requires additional analysis of
an accomplice's statement for particularized guarantees of reliability, the
question then becomes what criteria the court should consider. Custo-
dial confessions, i.e. confessions to the police, have traditionally been of
particular concern to the courts. Lilly reiterates the historical concern
that custodial confessions to the police are unreliable because the
accomplice has a motive to shift blame to the defendant in order to curry
favor. Although Justice Stevens's opinion creates an almost irrefutable
presumption that an accomplice's statement that implicates a defendant
is inadmissible, Lilly is a plurality opinion and therefore Justice Ste-
vens's criteria are not binding. Thus, courts have the leeway to: (1) limit
Lilly to its facts; (2) engage in a discretionary case-by-case analysis; or
(3) attempt to divine criteria from the plurality opinion.
A. The Admissibility of Custodial Confessions in Federal Court
Federal courts have flexibility in deciding what criteria to consider
when analyzing whether a statement is reliable under the second prong
of Roberts. For example, in Lopez-Garcia, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit admitted the statements of two accomplices to the police
118. Id. at 886 (citing Lilly, 527 U.S. 131-32).
119. SALTZBURG, supra note 48, at 417.
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that inculpated the defendant as statements against the non-testifying
accomplice's penal interest.'12  The circuit court, relying on Lilly, held
that the statements did not fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception,
but that their admission would not violate the Confrontation Clause
because the statements had independent indicia of reliability. 121
Francisco Lopez-Garcia was accused of conspiring to harbor illegal
aliens and harboring illegal aliens. 22 Lopez-Garcia had a safe house in
Mexico that he used to smuggle workers across the border. 123 The pros-
ecution submitted statements made by alien to border patrol agents
admitting their illegal status. 24 The district court found that the workers
statements were admissible against Lopez-Garcia as statements against
their penal interests because the workers had returned to Mexico and
thus were unavailable, their admission of their status subjected them to
criminal liability, and the statements contained "particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness."' 25
The circuit court asserted that according to Lilly there was no Con-
frontation Clause violation because the statements had "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness."' 26 The circuit court relied upon the four
factors discussed in Dutton v. Evans127 in order to determine that the
workers' statements were trustworthy. Dutton outlines the following
factors: "(1) whether the statement contains an 'express assertion' of
past fact; (2) whether the declarant has personal knowledge of the facts
asserted; (3) whether there was a possibility of faulty recollection; and
(4) whether the circumstances suggest the declarant had a reason to mis-
represent the facts asserted."' 28 After considering these factors, the cir-
cuit held that the workers had personal knowledge of their immigration
status, there was little risk of faulty recollection, and it was unlikely that
the workers would lie about their illegal status. 29 Therefore, the circuit
court chose to use past precedent, rather than relying solely upon the
criteria outlined in Justice Stevens's and Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinions.
United States v. Gomez suggests that courts could also consider the
120. United States v. Lopez-Garcia, No. 98-2252, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22369 at *11-15
(10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1999).
121. Id.
122. Id. at *3.
123. Id. at *9.
124. Id.
125. Id. at *10.
126. Id. at *12-13.
127. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
128. Lopez-Garcia, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 22369 at *13 (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89).
129. Id. at *13-14.
2001]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
following factors when trying to determine if a statement is reliable
whether:
(1) the statements were sufficiently detailed that they would have
been difficult to fabricate; (2) there is no evidence the statements
were coerced; (3) both [accomplices] were in a position to have had
personal knowledge of the disputed events; (4) the statements were
made soon after the events occurred, so it is unlikely their recollec-
tion would have been faulty; and (5) there was no evidence presented
as to a reason for retaliation against the [defendant]. 130
United States v. Castelan131 is an example how Lilly can provide
the flexibility of a case-by-case approach. Although the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not find that an accomplice's state-
ment to the police that inculpated the defendant was admissible, the
approach of the court could potentially lead to liberal admission of
accomplice confessions. The court noted that "[s]ince Lilly was decided,
no circuit has yet determined if-and under what circumstances-an
accomplice's custodial confession implicating a defendant can ever be
deemed to posses sufficient inherent indicia of trustworthiness to satisfy
the Confrontation Clause."'' 32 As a result, the court proceeded to ana-
lyze the facts of the case using a case-by-case approach. The court did
not appear to find that the criteria outlined by Justice Stevens were bind-
ing, yet the court held that the statements lacked indicia of reliability
"[b]ecause [the accomplice's] post-arrest statements were made in custo-
dial interviews with law enforcement officials in which [the accomplice]
specifically inquired as to the benefits of his cooperation with authori-
ties."' 133 Thus, the court declined to adopt any specific criteria instead
appearing to rely on a case-by-case fact sensitive analysis. Thus, the
Lilly opinion still provides opportunities for federal courts to admit
codefendant confessions.
B. The Admissibility of Custodial Confessions in State Courts
Some state courts have admitted an unavailable accomplice's out-
of-court statement against a defendant under hearsay exceptions for
statements against penal interest because the statements contained suffi-
cient indicia of reliability. State courts have done this by: (1) limiting
Lilly to its facts; (2) refusing to find the criteria outlined in the opinion
of Justice Stevens binding; or (3) attempting to derive criteria from the
130. United States v. Gomez, 191 F.3d 1214, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
131. 219 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2000).
132. Id. at 695.
133. Id.
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plurality in Lilly to use in determining whether an accomplice's state-
ment is reliable.
Some state courts have limited Lilly to its facts. In People v.
Campbell,134 a state trial court admitted under Illinois's residual hearsay
exception a written declaration of an unavailable accomplice given to
the police implicating the defendant.' 35 Although the lower court did
not admit the confession under the state's hearsay exception for state-
ments against the declarant's penal interest, the appellate court noted
that "[i]n Lilly, the Court held that accomplices confessions that incul-
pate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule . . . thus, it is apparent that [the accomplice's] statement
must contain particularized guarantees of trustworthiness to satisfy the
confrontation clause. (sic)"' 36
The court then distinguished the facts in Campbell from the facts in
Lilly. The Campbell court held:
that the statement in Lilly failed to contain sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness, the Court was persuaded by the fact that the declar-
ant made statements solely in the presence of governmental authori-
ties, the declarant was responding to leading questions, and the
declarant was under the influence of alcohol. Here, in contrast, [the
declarant] was accompanied by his attorney, he was not responding
to leading questions, and no evidence indicated that he was under the
influence of alcohol or any other substance.' 37
The Campbell court also noted that the declarant's testimony was not
exchanged for the dismissal of charges and the declarant's lawyer
reviewed the statement with him and encouraged him to be truthful. 38
Some courts have also found that the criteria outlined in Lilly are
not binding. In People v. Schutte, 139 the Michigan Court of Appeals
held that it was not bound by the criteria outlined in Lilly to assist courts
in determining if a statement contains particularized guarantees of relia-
bility under the second prong of Roberts because, as the Michigan
Supreme Court opinion People v. Beasley 4 ' points out, Lilly was a plu-
rality opinion.'41 Instead of using the criteria discussed in Lilly, the
Michigan Court of Appeals relied upon the criteria described by the
Michigan Supreme Court in Beasley. These factors include:
134. 721 N.E.2d 1225 (III. App. Ct. 1999).
135. Id. at 1227.
136. Id. at 1230.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 613 N.W.2d 370 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
140. 609 N.W.2d 581 (Mich. 2000).
141. Schutte, 613 N.W.2d at 376.
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whether the statement was (1) voluntarily given, (2) made to family,
friends, colleagues, or confederates-that is someone who would
speak the truth, and (4) uttered spontaneously at the initiation of the
declarant and without prompting or inquiry by the listener. On the
other hand, the presence of the following factors would favor a find-
ing of inadmissibility: whether the statement (1) was made to law
enforcement or at the promoting of the listener, (2) minimizes the
role of responsibility of the declarant or shifts blame to the accom-
plice, (3) was made to avenge the declarant or to curry favor, and (4)
whether the declarant had a motive to lie or distort the truth.' 42
The appellate court concluded that the facts in Schutte indicate "the
[custodial] statement possessed sufficient indicia of reliability to be
admitted against the defendant despite his inability to cross-examine.' ' 43
The court points to the fact that the declarant: (1) voluntarily appeared at
the station; (2) made the statement after the defendant "urged [him] to
tell the truth;" (3) was informed that he was free to go because he was
not in custody; (4) made the statement in a narrative form; and (5) did
not shift blame.' 4
In State v. Jones145 the Oregon Court of Appeals also held that the
criteria in Lilly were not "binding as precedent" and instead followed
Oregon Supreme Court cases construing the Confrontation Clause
because the "holding in Lilly does not contradict" the Oregon Supreme
Court's prior precedent. 146 The Oregon appellate court used the follow-
ing criteria:
(1) whether the declarant had been read his Miranda rights; (2)
whether the statement was given in response to police interrogation-
and, if so, the duration and intensity of that interrogation; (3) whether
the statements were made pursuant to an offer of leniency; (4)
whether the statements exposed the declarant to the same level of
criminal liability as the defendant; (5) whether the declarant either
was unaware of the consequences or erroneously believed that the
story would help him; (6) whether the statements contained a detailed
account of the incident; and (7) whether the declarant's demeanor
was either evasive or defensive. 147
Some of these criteria, such as considering whether a declarant had
received a Miranda warning, are specifically prohibited in Justice Ste-
vens's Lilly opinion. Thus, state courts have some flexibility in deciding
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 377.
145. 15 P.3d 616 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
146. Id. at 625; see generally State v. Franco, 950 P.2d 348 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); State v.
Wilson, 918 P.2d 826 (Or. 1996); State v. Nielsen, 853 P.2d 256 (Or. 1993).
147. Jones, 15 P.3d at 621 (citing Franco, 950 P.2d at 352).
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how to integrate Lilly with prior state court precedent regarding the Con-
frontation Clause. The effect of Lilly in state courts may depend upon
existing precedent as well as the state court's approach towards the plu-
rality opinion.
Unlike the Michigan Supreme Court or the Oregon Court of
Appeals, other states have tried to derive a holding from the Lilly opin-
ion that provides criteria to analyze a custodial statement under the sec-
ond prong of Roberts. Because Lilly is a plurality opinion, state courts
have some flexibility in determining what criteria to look at when decid-
ing whether an accomplice's statement is reliable.
For example, in Commonwealth v. Young, 148 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that although "the Court did not speak with one
voice. . [t]he multiplicity of opinions, however, does not necessarily
mandate that no holding may be gleaned from Lilly."'49 The court con-
cluded that:
a majority of the [Supreme] Court would agree that statements made
to the authorities by a non-testifying accomplice which inculpate the
defendant more than the accomplice are not admissible pursuant to a
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay doctrine and thus do not sat-
isfy the first prong of the Roberts test. Furthermore, although Chief
Justice Rehnquist specifically states in his concurring opinion in Lilly
that he would not reach the second prong of the Roberts test ...
Justice Stevens was indisputably correct when he stated that in exam-
ining this second prong, a court may not resolve the issue of a state-
ment's reliability by reference to other, corroborative evidence
introduced at trial.150
Thus, the criteria identified by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court are
considerably broader than the criteria outlined in Justice Stevens's opin-
ion. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court left the question of what criteria
should be considered open, concluding that "the proper method of con-
ducting such an inquiry is to focus on the circumstances surrounding the
giving of the statement."'' Although the court concluded that the state-
ments in Young did not contain "particularized guarantees of reliability"
based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances,15 2 the
case-by-case approach adopted by Pennsylvania could potentially be
flexible and may not be "the important weapon"'' 53 that the defense bar
anticipates.
148. 748 A.2d 166 (Pa. 2000).
149. Id. at 189.
150. Id. at 191.
151. Id. at 192.
152. Id. at 193.
153. Rudolf & Widenhouse, supra note 9, at 44.
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In People v. Farrell, the Colorado Court of Appeals took a similar
approach, concluding that under Lilly the court should consider "where
and when the statement was made, what prompted the statement, how
the statement was made, and what the statement contained," but should
not "rely on other independent evidence that also implicates the defen-
dant." 154 In fact, the Colorado Court of Appeals in this case merely
followed the pre-existing precedent and found that it comported with the
requirements of Lilly. 155
Thus, state courts appear to be more willing to interpret the Lilly
opinion broadly in order to continue admitting codefendant confessions.
This may be particularly significant in jurisdictions that are not bound
by the approach in Williamson because state courts may continue to lib-
erally admit codefendant custodial confessions by broadly interpreting
the limits imposed by the plurality opinion.
V. THE IMPACT OF LILLY ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS
MADE TO FAMILY AND FRIENDS
The Supreme Court in Lilly appears to be more ambivalent about
out-of-court accomplice's statements made to family or friends. Justice
Rehnquist suggested that confessions to a family member or friend "bear
sufficient indicia of reliability to be placed before the jury without con-
frontation of the declarant."'' 5 6 Justice Rehnquist cited Dutton v. Evans
to support this argument. In Dutton, the Supreme Court in a plurality
opinion held that the admission of an unavailable codefendant's confes-
sion to a cellmate against a defendant did not violate the Confrontation
Clause where the codefendant spontaneously confessed to his cellmate
and there was no indication that the confession was unreliable.'57 Jus-
tice Rehnquist argued, "[tihe Court in Dutton recognized that statements
to fellow prisoners, like confessions to family members or friends, bear
sufficient indicia of reliability to be placed before a jury without con-
frontation of the declarant."' 158 Contrary to Justice Stevens's assertion
that Dutton is an exception, Justice Rehnquist stated that Dutton is "a
case wholly outside the 'unbroken line' of cases, in which custodial con-
fessions laying blame on a codefendant have been found to violate the
Confrontation Clause."159 Therefore, Justice Rehnquist saw "no reason
to foreclose the possibility that such statements [to family and friends],
even those that inculpate a codefendant, may fall under a firmly rooted
154. 10 P.3d 672, 676 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
155. Id.
156. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 147 (1999).
157, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970).
158. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 147.
159. Id.
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hearsay exception."' 6 °
Justice Stevens's opinion argued that Justice Rehnquist's interpre-
tation of Dutton is in error because:
While Justice Stewart's lead opinion observed that the declarant's
statement was against his penal interest, the Court's judgment did not
rest on that point, and in no way purported to hold that statements
with such an attribute were presumptively admissible. Rather, the
five Justices in the majority emphasized the unique aspects of the
case and emphasized that the coconspirator spontaneously made the
statement and "had no apparent reason to lie."'
' 6
'
The Supreme Court appears to be split on this issue. Three Justices
joined Justice Stevens's point of view that confessions made to friends
and family should not be presumptively placed before the jury without
confrontation. Although only two Justices joined Justice Rehnquist's
opinion, Justice Thomas notes in his concurrence that he agrees with
"the Chief Justice that the Clause does not impose a blanket ban on the
government's use of accomplice statements that incriminate a defen-
dant." ' 62 This was not a direct endorsement of Justice Rehnquist's argu-
ments, however, Justice Thomas's statements appear to lend support to
Justice Rehnquist's assertions. Justice Scalia, however, was silent, leav-
ing the issue open. Therefore, it is possible to interpret Lilly as provid-
ing a categorical rule that statements to family are inherently reliable
because there is no motive to shift blame. It is also possible, however,
to interpret Lilly as requiring a more substantial analysis for particular-
ized guarantees of reliability for all accomplice confessions implicating
a defendant, including confessions made to family or friends.
The argument that a statement to family or friends is more reliable
than a statement to police appears to be the most successful argument
that prosecutors have advanced under Lilly. The argument may draw its
strength from earlier lower court decisions applying Williamson, which
held that statements to family had independent indicia of reliability
because there was no incentive to shift blame.' 63
A. Statements to Family and Friends in Federal Courts
United States v. Robbins164 exemplifies a broad interpretation of
Lilly. In Robbins, the district court concluded that the statements of an
160. Id.
161. Id. at 133 n.2 (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89).
162. Id. at 143 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
163. See generally United States v. Moses, 148 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v.
Barone, 114 F.3d 1284 (lst Cir. 1997); United States v. Mathews, 20 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 1994);
United States v. Costa, 31 F.3d 1073 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
164. 197 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1999).
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accomplice to his girlfriend implicating a defendant were admissible
against both the accomplice and the defendant. 16 5 The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on grounds that the statement satisfied
Lilly because the codefendant's statements to his girlfriend about the
defendant "equally inculpated them both" and "the statement was made
voluntarily in a conversation with Roberts, the declarant's fiancde and
confidant. The circumstances in which the statement was made provide
no reason to suspect any coercion, any ulterior motive, any desire to
curry favor with authorities, any reason not to tell the truth."'1 66
In United States v Tocco,167 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed a lower court's admission under Williamson of an accom-
plice's out-of-court statement implicating the defendant. The court
found that the admission of these statements did not violate the Confron-
tation Clause under Lilly because the statements were reliable. The
court held "that the circumstances surrounding [the accomplice's] state-
ments in this case indicate that the statements were trustworthy, particu-
larly in light of the fact that [the accomplice's] statements were made to
his son in confidence, rather than to the police or to any other authority
for the purpose of shifting the blame to [the defendant]."'' 68
In United States v Shea,169 the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit appears to indicate that statements made to family and friends are
per se reliable. In Shea, the district court admitted an accomplice's
statement under Williamson and the circuit was asked to reconsider the
finding in light of Lilly. The court held that the statement was admissi-
ble under Lilly because "all [statements] identified in this case were
made to friends or companions, not to police, and were not of the 'blame
shifting variety."" 7 The court's approach indicates a view that state-
ments to family or friends are distinguishable from statements to police
because the underlying relationship is qualitatively different. Thus,
some courts have adopted an almost unspoken rule that statements to
family and friends are inherently reliable and therefore admissible.
Other courts, however, have subjected statements made to family or
friends to more searching scrutiny. In United States v. Gibson, 7' fed-
eral prosecutors attempted to introduce "hearsay statements made by
Browning [an unavailable accomplice] to his sister," that inculpated the
165. Id. at 840.
166. Id.
167. 200 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2000).
168. Id. at 416.
169. 211 F.3d 658 (lst Cir. 2000).
170. Id. at 669.
171. 84 F. Supp. 2d 784 (S.D. W.Va. 2000).
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defendant as a statement against Browning's interest. 7 2 The district
court noted that some other courts have found that statements made to
friends and family are more reliable because typically "the declarant had
no ulterior motive or other reason not to tell the truth." '73 The district
court, however, disagreed and concluded:
although Browning's statements were made to his sister rather than to
law enforcement officers and do not appear to shift blame to Mr.
Gibson, this court does not find that such factors are sufficient to
demonstrate that Browning's statements are incontestably probative,
competent, and reliable. This court disagrees with the view held by
the Seventh Circuit and by commentators that Lilly does not apply to
non-custodial confessions or to confessions that do not spread blame
to co-criminals. '74
B. Statements to Family and Friends in State Courts
There are several examples of cases in which state courts have
allowed accomplice confessions made to friends or family implicating a
defendant as statements against a non-testifying accomplice's penal
interest against a defendant under Lilly. 75 In State v. Gonzales, the New
Mexico Supreme Court distinguished between custodial statements to
police and statements to family or friends because in statements to
friends there is no incentive to shift blame or curry favor.'7 6
In Bruton v. Phillips,'77 a federal district court denied a habeas
corpus appeal of Paul Bruton. Bruton was convicted of murdering Alan
Kahn and Valenta Hurst.' 78 An accomplice to the crime, named Perry
Davis, made several statements to friends confessing to the murder and
implicating Bruton.' 79 Davis's statements, including the portions that
inculpated Bruton, were admitted against Bruton at trial under a state
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. 180 Susan Cow-
ard, a friend of Davis, testified that Davis told her "that [Bruton] had
shot Hurst in the face and he had strangled and slit Kahn's throat."''
172. Id. at 785.
173. Id. at 789.
174. Id. at 788 (referring to United States v. Robbins, 197 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1999)); Leading
Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 233, 241 (1999).
175. See United States v. Shea, 211 F.3d 658 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d
401 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Robbins, 197 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1999); Bruton v. Phillips, 64
F. Supp. 2d 669 (E.D. Mich. 1999); People v. Beasley, 609 N.W.2d 581 (Mich. 2000); State v.
Gonzales, 989 P.2d 419 (N.M. 1999).
176. 989 P.2d 419, 427 (N.M. 1999).
177. 64 F. Supp. 2d 669 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
178. Id. at 673.
179. Id. at 674.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 675.
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Coward also admitted that "she had altered earlier statements that she
had made to the police, after being threatened with prosecution for per-
jury. Coward also received one-thousand ($1,000) dollars from law
enforcement authorities to relocate to another state after the trial
ended."' 82 Marcia McLean-Davis, Davis's friend, testified that Davis
"told her that he had killed Alan (Kahn) by choking him and that
[Bruton] had shot Hurst in the face" and that Davis showed her Kahn's
wallet.' 83 McLean-Davis had "previously been held in contempt of
court for committing perjury in front of the grand jury. She admitted
that she changed her story after being threatened with prosecution for
perjury."' 84 She was also given immunity to testify again in front of the
grand jury and $350 to relocate after the trial. 8 5 The statements of
Coward and McLean-Davis were also admitted under the state hearsay
exception for statements of a non-testifying declarant against the declar-
ant's interest.'86 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction
and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. 187
The district court in Bruton v. Phillips agreed with the Michigan
Court of Appeals and held that the lower court did not err in admitting
the statements because Davis was unavailable, his statements were
against his penal interest, and the inculpatory portions of the confessions
did not violate the Confrontation Clause because they were reliable since
they were made to friends.' 88 The district court denied Bruton's habeas
corpus appeal on the grounds that "the statements are admissible under
the second prong of the test set forth in Roberts and reiterated in Lilly;
that is, the statements bear 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness'
that renders them admissible under the totality of the circumstances."' 89
The district court agreed with the state court holding that the
"inculpatory portions" of Davis's statements were reliable because: (1)
the statements were made to friends; (2) they were spontaneous and vol-
untary; and (3) Davis made no attempt to diminish his role in the
murders.' 90 The court cited Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in
Lilly for support of its ruling.' 9 ' The district court, however, noted that:
[this court] has serious misgivings with respect to the distinction





186. Id. at 676.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 678.
189. Id. at 679-80.
190. Id. at 681-82.
191. Id. at 680.
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those made to law enforcement officers. Often there are incentives to
misrepresent the truth in conversation with acquaintances, family and
friends that are as powerful as the incentives to misrepresent the truth
in conversations with the authorities.
192
The court does not address the state's role in securing the testimony of
Coward and McLean-Davis by threatening them with prosecution, giv-
ing them money to relocate, or providing immunity before the grand
jury. Here the friends the declarant confessed to may have had motives
to characterize the accomplice's statements. Thus, in Bruton v. Philips,
it appears that the state was able to accomplish indirectly what it could
not do directly. So long as it is obtained through a private actor and not
a state actor the prosecution may use a confession potentially including a
declarant's non-self-inculpatory statements as a statement against an
unavailable declarant's penal interest.
The distinction between confessions to family or friends versus
confessions to the police is supported by the rational that the motive to
shift blame in order to curry favor or receive a better sentence is not
present when an accomplice confesses to a family member or friend.
This rational, however, ignores the incentive that an accomplice may
have in minimizing or aggrandizing his involvement in nefarious activ-
ity when confessing their sins to a loved one or friend. In our hypotheti-
cal, Harry may not have been forthright with his girlfriend; he may have
minimized his involvement in order to placate his girlfriend or aggran-
dized his involvement in order to impress her. An accomplice may have
emotional incentives to minimize her involvement when confessing to
family. For example, an accomplice may be ashamed or feel guilty tell-
ing his mother or sibling about his actions, giving the accomplice an
incentive to shift blame or minimize his involvement. Given the preju-
dicial effect of codefendant confessions, the Court should not abdicate
its role as gatekeeper by relying on the underlying relationship between
the accomplice and their family member or friend.
The rationale behind an assumption that accomplice confessions to
family and friends are admissible also ignores the incentive family mem-
bers or friends may have in characterizing their loved ones statements.
To understand this, one only need conjure up the image of the jilted
lover. Harry was found dead, shot with a quarter on both eyes, suppose
that his accomplices may have had a hand in his murder. Harry's girl-
friend is probably going to have an emotional response to the circum-
stances surrounding his death. How might this affect her decision to
come forward to the police? Will her feelings toward those who she
perceives to be responsible for Harry's death influence how she charac-
192. Id. at 681.
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terizes Harry's confession to her while talking to the police? Although
bias can be addressed by cross-examination, a confession is such power-
ful testimony that it will likely have a prejudicial effect. Furthermore,
recording or documenting custodial confessions is standard police prac-
tice. There is always a risk that the police could inaccurately report to
the jury the unavailable accomplice's custodial confession inculpating a
defendant, but at least there is likely to be a paper trail. The risk when a
friend or relative testifies as to the unavailable accomplice's confession,
however, is greater because a friend or relative is less likely to document
or record the confession. Thus, the Court is justified in acting as a gate-
keeper in order to prevent the prejudicial effect of unreliable confessions
being presented to the jury.
The case of State v. Sheets193 raises some of these very issues. In
Sheets, a seventeen-year-old high school girl was raped and murdered on
September 23, 1992. On September 17, 1996, the Omaha police
received a report from a woman, Barb Olson, claiming that a young man
named Adam Barnett told her son-in-law Jason LaNoue that he and Jer-
emy Sheets were involved in the murder.' 94 The police took the state-
ments of Jason and Barb. The police, however, also had Barb's
daughter Rachell La Noue "wear a concealed radio wire in order to
secretly tape a conversation between herself and Barnett regarding the
murder. '"'95 During Barnett's conversation with Rachell LaNoue, Bar-
nett confessed to driving the get away car, but Barnett claimed that
Sheets committed the murder. 196 Barnett also revealed that his friendship
with Sheets had recently deteriorated because Sheets "had sex with my
lady." 197
Barnett was arrested and taken into custody. While in custody,
Barnett confessed to police that he was present during the murder, but he
maintained that Sheets raped and killed the girl. 198 Barnett later
recanted his confession, claiming that he made up the story "to impress
people at a party."'199 On November 13, 1996, Barnett committed sui-
cide in his jail cell.2"' Sheets was charged with the murder of the young
girl. At Sheets's trial, the prosecution admitted the full text of Barnett's
confession to the police under the Nebraska state hearsay exception for
193. 618 N.W.2d 117 (Neb. 2000).




198. Id. at 123-25.
199. Id. at 126. Barnett also allegedly recanted his confession to family members and friends
while in jail. Id. at 125.
200. Id.
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statements against the penal interest. 20 It does not appear that Barnett's
statement made to Rachell LaNoue while under surveillance was entered
into evidence.20 2 Sheets was convicted of murder. The Nebraska
Supreme Court reversed Sheets's conviction because under Lilly Bar-
nett's confession to the police did not fall under a firmly rooted hearsay
exception or contain independent indicia of reliability.20 3 The Nebraska
Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial.20 4
Sheets presents several interesting issues. First, it raises questions
as to whether Barnett's statements to his friends were more reliable than
his statements to police. He later recanted his confession to police,
claiming that he made the statements in order to impress friends at a
party. This indicates that the reliability of the confession to his "friends"
may be no more reliable than his statement to the police. Is the relation-
ship an accomplice established with someone they just met at a party or
a bartender sacred or reliable? Must the court examine the quality of the
relationship between the accomplice and the family member or friend to
whom the accomplice confesses, or are these types of relationships
inherently reliable?
Secondly, one wonders if Barnett's statements to Rachell LaNoue
while under surveillance could be admissible against Sheets under the
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. According to
Justice Rehnquist's opinion, Barnett's statements were made to a friend
and therefore they "bear sufficient indicia of reliability to be placed
before the jury without confrontation of the declarant. ' '20 5 If this is true,
should it matter that the friend was acting in concert with the police?
Should it matter if the confession is spontaneously made to a friend? A
friend or loved one may ask leading questions or elicit a confession,
whether at the direction of the police or not. Any parent of an adoles-
cent can tell you that that leading questions and interrogation are useful
tools. Is there any less incentive to lie or shift blame when it is your
mother instead of the police asking the questions?
For example, in United States v. Boone, °6 at the FBI's request,
Tarchanda Cunningham was surreptitiously taping conversations with
her boyfriend, Lamar Williams, because the FBI suspected Williams of
201. Id. at 125-26. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-804(2)(c).
202. See id. at 127.
203. Id. at 137. The Nebraska Supreme Court only addressed the Confrontation Clause issue
and did not examine whether the statements were properly admitted under the state hearsay
exception because the issue was not raised by Sheets on appeal. Id. at 127.
204. Id. at 137.
205. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 147 (1999).
206. 229 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 2000).
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several crimes. 207 During his conversations with his girlfriend, Williams
inculpated himself as well as Boone in a robbery. The two men were
tried separately. A federal district court allowed the recorded statements
of Williams to be admitted against Boone under a hearsay exception for
statements against interest. 20 8 Boone was found guilty and appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the grounds
that the use of the recorded statements at his trial violated the Confronta-
tion Clause.20 9 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and held
that:
the taped conversation between Williams and his girlfriend occurred
in what appeared to Williams to be a private setting and in which, as
far as he knew, there was no police involvement. He simply was
confiding to his girlfriend, unabashedly inculpating himself while
making no effort to mitigate his own conduct. The circumstances and
setting of Williams's statements distinguish this case from Lilly, as
does the content of Williams's statements. It was unselfconsciously
self-incriminating and not an effort to shift blame.2 0
The Boone opinion cites Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in
Lilly for support2 ' and offers support for a prosecutors that chose to
argue that admission of statements similar to Barnett's statements to
Rachell La Noue in the Sheets case would not violate the Confrontation
Clause (assuming they are admissible under the state hearsay exception
for statements against interest). The Nebraska Supreme Court did not
directly address whether Barnett's statement to Rachell La Noue would
be admissible because that issue was not before the court. The court,
however, noted that "some courts, prior to Lilly, have determined that
statements made under circumstances not present in this case, such as
statements made to people unconnected with law enforcement, were
genuinely self-inculpatory and, thus fell under a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. 1 2 The Nebraska Supreme Court also noted that "[o]ther
courts have specifically addressed the difference between statements
made outside of police custody and statements made while in custody,
noting that the latter is presumed to be unreliable."2 '3 The court con-
cluded that "[c]ourts that have considered the issue after Lilly v. Vir-
ginia, have overwhelmingly found that confessions of an accomplice
that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted hear-
207. Id. at 1232.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1233.
210. Id. at 1234 (emphasis in original).
211. Id. (citing Lilly v. Virginia 527 U.S. 116, 147 (1999)).
212. State v. Sheets, 618 N.W.2d 117, 129 (Neb. 2000).
213. Id.
[Vol. 55:891
STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST UNDER LILLY
say exception, especially when such statements are made to law enforce-
ment authorities. 214
C. Interpreted Broadly Lilly May Undermine Protections
Historically Located in Bruton
Lilly was decided in the context of a state court's interpretation of a
state hearsay rule where the defendant was tried separately from any
codefendants. Lilly's impact in cases where two codefendants are tried
jointly, however, is unclear. Professor James B. Haddad has explored
the interrelationship between the Bruton Doctrine and the admissibility
of accomplice confessions under hearsay exceptions for statements
against interest. 215 Lilly raises many of the issues Professor Haddad has
explored, and may add a new twist. Federal courts have traditionally
analyzed accomplice confessions in joint trials under Bruton v. United
States216 and accomplice confessions in individual trials under William-
son v. United States.2 17 Bruton held that in a joint trial a prosecutor may
not admit the confession of an unavailable (or nontestifying) codefend-
ant that inculpates another defendant because the admission of the con-
fession would violate the defendant's rights under the Confrontation
Clause. "A common misconception is that Bruton interpreted the Con-
frontation Clause so as to prohibit the use of a codefendant's confession
or admission as evidence against a defendant.
21 s
In fact, Bruton "rested upon the explicit assumption that under
domestic law, the confession of codefendant Evans was inadmissible
against defendant Bruton. ' 2 19 In subsequent cases:
the Supreme Court suggested each jurisdiction can shape its own
rules of evidence to admit some codefendant confessions as evidence
against a defendant, under an exception to the hearsay rule, and still
not be deemed guilty of a Confrontation Clause violation, even where
the defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine the confessing
214. Id. (citations omitted).
215. See generally James B. Haddad, The Future of Confrontation Clause Developments: What
will emerge when the Supreme Court Synthesizes the Diverse Lines of Confrontation Decisions?,
81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77 (1990) [hereinafter "Haddad I"]; James B. Haddad & Richard
G. Agin, A Potential Revolution in Bruton Doctrin: Is Bruton Applicable Where Domestic
Evidence Rules Prohibit Use of a Codefendant's Confession as Evidence Against a Defendant
Although the Confrontation Clause Would Allow Such Use, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 235,
239 (1990) [hereinafter Haddad & Agin]; James B. Haddad, Post Bruton Developments: A
Reconsideration of the Confrontation Rational, and a Proposal for A Due Process Evaluation of
Limiting Instructions, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. I (1980) [hereinafter Haddad II].
216. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
217. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
218. Haddad 1, supra note 215, at 239.
219. ld.; see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 128 n.3 (1968).
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codefendant.22°
Of course, this is provided the confession contains indicia of reliabil-
ity.22' Thus, Lilly could dilute protections under Bruton in two ways
either: (1) by allowing jurisdictions that permit codefendant confessions
under a hearsay exception for statements against penal interest to liber-
ally admit codefendant confessions; or (2) "in those jurisdictions whose
evidentiary rules would prohibit use of the codefendant's confession as
evidence against the defendant, even though the Confrontation Clause
would not mandate such exclusion, the question remains whether Bruton
requires severance lest juries improperly consider against a defendant a
statement of a codefendant. 22 2
Prior to the Court's ruling in Lilly, Professor Haddad observed that
"[t]he degree to which a declaration against interest theory could erode
Bruton depends upon the frequency of the prosecution's success in con-
vincing courts that declarations against interest are reliable enough to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 22 3 For example, in United States v.
Wilson, a case decided prior to Lilly, three defendants were tried
together. The prosecution admitted the statements of one codefendant
made to a friend, shortly after the witness's murder, that the codefendant
spotted the witness and told the other defendants that the witness was in
the area.225 The codefendant's statements were admitted against all of
the defendants in the joint trial. The defendants objected that the state-
ments were hearsay and violated the Confrontation Clause citing Bruton.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that the statements were admissible under Williamson as statements
against penal interest because the statements were self-inculpatory, they
implicated the declarant in a conspiracy, and they were reliable because
they were made to a friend.22 6 The court held that the Confrontation
Clause was not a barrier because according to Cruz v. New York, "a
court may, in a joint trial, admit an out-of-court confession or statement
against penal interest by one defendant that inculpates a codefendant if
the statement is 'directly admissible' against the other defendant. ' 227 A
statement is "directly admissible if it is reliable, as defined in Lee and in
Ohio v. Roberts, and if the declarant is unavailable to testify. 22' 8 The
220. Haddad I, supra note 215, at 236; see also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986); New
Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986).
221. Id.
222. Haddad I, supra note 215, at 251.
223. Id.
224. 160 F.3d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
225. Id. at 736.
226. Id. at 739.
227. Id. at 740 (citing Cruz v. New York 481 U.S. 186 (1987)).
228. Id.
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Wilson court found that the codefendant was unavailable because he
refused to testify and that the statements contained "particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness" because the statements were made to a
friend . 2 9 The court did not decide whether statements against penal
interest hearsay exception was firmly rooted because, "after Lee the
question remains whether statements against penal interest can qualify
as a firmly rooted hearsay exception as a class or whether each statement
must qualify through its particular guarantees of trustworthiness. '"230
After Wilson, the Court decided Lilly. Although Lilly answers the
question the Wilson court left open, the fractured Court did not speak
with one voice. Therefore, the liberal interpretations of Lilly discussed
in this Comment could undermine defendants' rights under Bruton as
well as in individual trials. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
case United States v. Robbins raises some of these issues.23 Robbins
was a joint trial in which two codefendants were accused of selling and
transporting drugs.2 32 One defendant told his girlfriend that he and his
codefendant sold drugs together.233 The district court admitted the state-
ment against the alleged declarant with a limiting jury instruction that
the statement was not to be considered against the other codefendant.234
On appeal, the codefendant that was implicated by the declarant's
statement argued that admission of the statements violated his rights
under the Confrontation Clause.235 The court of appeals concluded that
although the statement was clearly against the declarant's penal interest,
Rule 804(b)(3) "does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory state-
ments, even if they are made within a 'broader narrative that is generally
self-inculpatory,' except in certain circumstances. ' 236 The Seventh Cir-
cuit proceeded to analyze the issue under Lilly.
The court observed that in Lilly, the United States Supreme Court
stated that ever since Bruton it "has consistently either stated or assumed
that the mere fact that one accomplice's confession qualified as a state-
ment against his penal interest did not justify its use as evidence against
another person" in a joint trial.2 37 Thus, under Lilly, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that accomplice "confessions are not within a firmly rooted
exception to the hearsay rule" and the court moved to analyze whether
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 197 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1999).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 838.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 839 (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. at 116, 128 (1999)).
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the statement had "sufficient indicia of reliability. 238 The court of
appeals held that the statement "had sufficient indicia of reliability pre-
sent at the time the statement was made to make it trustworthy. The
statement was made voluntarily in a conversation with Roberts, the
declarant's fianc6e and confidante. "The circumstances in which the
statement was made provide no reason to suspect any coercion, any ulte-
rior motive, any desire to curry favor with authorities, any reason to
suspect any coercion. '' 239 The appeals court argued that "because the
statement would have been admissible against [the codefendant] under
the Rules of Evidence, the narrow rule of Bruton is not implicated.
240
The court also concluded that the limiting instruction cured any effect
Robert's testimony may have had on the jury.
In United States v. York, a case decided prior to Lilly, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that in Bruton "the Court's
ruling, however, was predicating upon the inadmissibility of the state-
ment against the defendant under the rules of evidence."' 241 The circuit
court argued that:
[T]he Court thus created an anomaly that continues to this day,
Bruton only prohibits the use of an inculpatory hearsay statement
against an accused when the jurisdiction's rules of evidence do not
permit that statement to be introduced into evidence against the
accused. Where the rules so permit, Bruton is inapplicable. Thus,
under Bruton and subsequent cases, whether an inculpatory hearsay
statement violates the Confrontation Clause turns on the rule of
evidence.242
Therefore, if statements to a friend are interpreted as per se reliable
under Lilly, protections historically located in Bruton may be under-
mined if courts do not feel obligated to analyze statements individually
for particularized guarantees of reliability. Furthermore, if courts either
find that truly-self-inculpatory statements are firmly rooted or frequently
find them to be reliable for Confrontation Clause purposes, the same
result could occur depending upon how broadly lower courts interpret
Williamson.
The impact of Lilly in jurisdictions whose evidentiary rules do not
permit codefendant confessions at all is also unclear. Professor Haddad
suggests that a conflict may arise where a state evidentiary rule is more
restrictive than what is required under the Confrontation Clause. He
notes that the prosecution could argue that severance is not required or
238. Id.
239. Id. at 840 (citing United States v. Hamilton, 19 F.3d 350, 355-57 (7th Cir. 1993).
240. Id.
241. United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1362 (7th Cir. 1991).
242. Id. at 1362 n.3.
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that "where domestic evidence rules exclude the confession as evidence
against a defendant, but where the Confrontation Clause would not man-
date exclusion, a limiting instruction is adequate and does not violate the
Confrontation Clause.2 43
Lilly does not directly address this issue, however, the opinion does
hold that the use of confessions in the trial of an individual defendant
does not violate the Confrontation Clause if the confession is reliable.
Additionally, the opinion makes no mention of whether the confession
must be admissible under domestic evidentiary rules in order to pass
constitutional muster. Therefore, the issue remains unresolved and
could pose potential problems for defendants in jurisdictions whose evi-
dentiary rules do not permit codefendant confessions. Professor James
Haddad has suggested that in this situation, "Bruton, if it is to survive at
all, must come to be read as resting on due process considerations relat-
ing to the adequacy of limiting instructions rather than on the confronta-
tion clause." '244
VI. CONCLUSION
At first glance, Lilly appears to provide defendants with a new and
powerful shield. Upon closer examination, however, the strength of the
protections offered by Lilly depends upon how lower courts interpret and
apply the opinion, and it remains to be seen how the precedents estab-
lished by Lilly will develop over time. A categorical ban on accomplice
confessions might result in the suppression of reliable and probative evi-
dence, while a categorical acceptance of accomplice confession creates a
risk of unreliable and prejudicial evidence influencing the jury.
Although a case-by-case approach balances these interests, the approach
also places substantial discretion in the hands of the judge.
Some courts appear to interpret Lilly as providing a presumption
that accomplice confessions made to family or friends are admissible,
but a presumption that accomplice confessions to the police are not
admissible unless case-by-case analysis reveals the confession is relia-
ble. This interpretation creates both a risk that unreliable and prejudicial
evidence may reach the jury, and a risk that a case-by-case analysis will
lead to the variable and unpredictable admission of accomplice custodial
confessions. The distinction between confessions made to family or
friends and custodial confessions is inconsistent and the courts would do
better to treat all confessions as the same and uniformly apply a pre-
sumption based upon Lilly that accomplice confessions are unreliable.
243. Haddad & Agin, supra note 215, at 252.
244. York, 933 F.2d at 1362 n.3 (citing to Haddad & Agin, supra note 215).
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Furthermore, in jurisdictions that are bound by Williamson, Lilly
can also be interpreted as creating a categorical distinction between
"truly self-inculpatory" accomplice statements and "non-self-inculpa-
tory" accomplice statements. This can be accomplished where a court
adopts Justice Rehnquist's argument that truly self-inculpatory state-
ments are firmly rooted. The same result can also be achieved if court
concludes either explicitly or indirectly that the Williamson analysis
includes a search for particularized guarantees of reliability sufficient to
satisfy the second rung of Roberts. If one adopts the position that Lilly
does not subject truly self-inculpatory statements to in depth analysis
beyond what is required under Williamson, this leaves open the possibil-
ity that a collaterally neutral statement could be categorically admissible
under a broad interpretation of Williams. Therefore, a "truly self-incul-
patory" accomplice's confession implicating a defendant could poten-
tially be categorically admissible, while "non-self-inculpatory"
statements are categorically inadmissible, or at least subject to more
searching analysis under Lilly. Although this categorical approach
appears to be more predictable than case-by-case analysis, the determi-
nation of whether a statement is "truly self-inculpatory" under William-
son is actually a fact-based decision that requires case-by-case analysis.
Thus, the Court seems to struggle to find a balance that can accom-
modate the Court's historical suspicion of custodial confessions and the
Court's desire to present the jury with all of the reliable and relevant
evidence. The Court has addressed these concerns in Lee, Williamson,
Lilly, and Bruton, however, these opinions have not been fully inte-
grated. This tension has created an inexact doctrine that leaves open
issues as to whether: (1) truly self-inculpatory accomplice confessions
that inculpate a defendant are inherently reliable and thus admissible
(either under a firmly rooted hearsay exception or under the second
prong of Roberts); (2) accomplice confessions to family and friends are
inherently reliable; and (3) what criteria courts should consider when
evaluating under the second prong of Roberts whether an accomplice
confession that inculpates a defendant is reliable. These issues present
opportunities for both the prosecution and the defendant to craft
arguments.
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